package nocoiner
Install
Dune Dependency
Authors
Maintainers
Sources
sha256=4e568df2f9800556e33406c75f36234c927b57bf48481f17dbb070256866990b
Description
This project implements Commitment Schemes using the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of secret-key encryption. Because this AES encryption mode provides both Message Confidentiality and Integrity, it fits perfectly the Hiding and Binding properties of Commitment Schemes. Confidentiality protects the message against passive attacks while integrity protects it from active attacks. GCM, so, works as an Authenticated Encryption where it roughly works as an encryption algorithm with MAC signatures on cipher data.
Published: 04 Jun 2019
README
nocoiner
A Commitment Scheme library for Coin Flipping/Tossing algorithms and sort.
About
This project implements Commitment Schemes using the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of secret-key encryption. Because this AES encryption mode provides both Message Confidentiality and Integrity, it fits perfectly the Hiding and Binding properties of Commitment Schemes. Confidentiality protects the message against passive attacks while integrity protects it from active attacks. GCM, so, works as an Authenticated Encryption where it roughly works as an encryption algorithm with MAC signatures on cipher data.
The hiding property states that it is impossible to discover the secret with the commitment data left alone, that is, the commitment receiver can't know the secret until the commitment sender reveals that through her opening key.
The binding property, on the other hand, ensures invariants on the commitment sender side. It disallows the sender to change the secret by using a different opening key. While the sender can refuse to reveal her secret, she can't cheat on the game. There's a variant of commitment schemes called Timed Commitments where the receiver can brute-force the commitment in the case of the sender aborting the game by refusing to send the opening key, tho. Another variant called Fuzzy Commitments accepts some noise during opening phase.
Commitment Schemes are one of the many Secure Multiparty Computation protocols/primitives, Secret Sharing is other famous cryptographic primitive in such field.
Installation
For the stable release, just type:
$ opam install nocoiner
To install/test the unstable version on this repository (assuming you're inside the project's root directory):
$ make install # 'make uninstall' reverts the changes
Testing
$ make test
Usage
As library (assuming you have linked the package nocoiner
below):
let secret = "I have nothing to hide."
let (c, o) = Nocoiner.commit secret
assert (secret = Nocoiner.reveal ~commitment:c ~opening:o)
Here, the Nocoiner.commit
operation is non-deterministic and the Nocoiner.reveal
is deterministic. The Nocoiner.reveal
operation may throw the following exceptions:
Nocoiner.Reasons.InvalidCommitment
, if the parsing of commitment fails.Nocoiner.Reasons.InvalidOpening
, if the opening key contains invalid data.Nocoiner.Reasons.BindingFailure
, if both commitment & opening are unrelated.
As the command-line interface (ignore all the $
below while typing):
$ echo "Something not really secret..." > secret.txt
$ cat secret.txt | nocoiner commit \
--commitment-file=commitment-box.txt \
--opening-file=opening-key.txt
$ nocoiner reveal \
--commitment-file=commitment-box.txt \
--opening-file=opening-key.txt > secret-output.txt
$ cat secret-output.txt
The complete API reference is available here. Coverage reports are generated too, please refer to the respective page.
Disclaimer
This library was not fully tested against side-channel attacks. Besides the good source of entropy by the nocrypto
's implementation of Fortuna PRNG algorithm, AES-GCM mode doesn't work well with huge amount of data. Keep in mind that the use cases of this library is for Secure Multiparty games such as online Gambling and Auctions. With other use cases, the security of this cryptographic primitive can be deemed as flawed.
Note that players can abort in the middle of a Commit-and-Reveal game, so you should as well deal with that on your code logic. The random encryption key and input vector only ensure the uniqueness locally, it's also possible to happen collisions of both random data on a distributed setting (it's due the sources of entropy being remote and different - so commitments and openings would be identical, think on that even if this probability is small). ~~In such case, you can either take a fingerprint of the host machine and a timestamp nonce into account, in the same sense of Elliott's CUID library~~ (we already cover that issue of distributed collisions by using a fingerprint of hashed process context).