package mldsa

Changes

0.1.1 (2026-09-20)

• Export SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 from mlkem as Mlkem.Fips202. A protocol that adopts ML-KEM often needs SHAKE itself, as HPKE does to derive an ML-KEM key pair, and digestif provides SHA-3 without the extendable-output functions. They are the functions ML-KEM already runs on. SHA3-256 and SHA3-512 stay internal, and mldsa and slhdsa are unchanged.
• Hold the exported functions to OpenSSL's answers at the block boundaries of both sponges, and SHAKE256 to known answers under js_of_ocaml, where the coverage was round trips alone.

0.1.0 (2026-09-20)

First release of the mlkem, mldsa, and slhdsa opam packages.

• Implement every FIPS 203 parameter set: ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, and ML-KEM-1024.
• Implement every FIPS 204 parameter set: ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87, including typed keys/signatures, strict decoding, contexts, and explicit hedged and deterministic PureML-DSA signing.
• Implement all twelve FIPS 205 parameter sets: SHA2 and SHAKE 128s/f, 192s/f, and 256s/f, including WOTS+, FORS, XMSS, hypertree signing, contexts, and explicit hedged and deterministic PureSLH-DSA signing.
• Implement SHA-256, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-512, SHAKE128, SHAKE256, HMAC, and MGF1 entirely in OCaml, with no C stubs or runtime package dependencies.
• Use shared parameterized engines, fixed-bound NTT arithmetic for ML-KEM and ML-DSA, ML-KEM implicit rejection, and the final FIPS 205 address-clearing and big-endian FORS rules.
• Provide abstract per-algorithm key, ciphertext, shared-secret, and signature types; exact-length and canonical decoders; caller-provided randomness; and seed-based key generation and serialization.
• Isolate expanded ACVP and raw-message hooks in the explicitly testing-only mlkem.for_testing, mldsa.for_testing, and slhdsa.for_testing libraries.
• Verify byte-for-byte NIST ACVP key generation and deterministic signatures for every parameter set; add all 2,863 applicable ML-KEM and ML-DSA cases from a pinned Wycheproof revision, pinned BoringSSL ML-KEM corpora, corruption and malformed-input tests, decoder fuzzing, and hash known answers.
• Check all 168 applicable NIST SLH-DSA signature-verification cases (24 valid and 144 invalid) and 36 signing known answers, covering hedged signing, 8192-byte messages, and 255-byte contexts for every parameter set.
• Redistribute the BoringSSL, Wycheproof, and NIST ACVP-Server test corpora with their upstream license notices; see LICENSE.md.
• Add native, bytecode, and js_of_ocaml portability coverage. JavaScript CI exercises all ML-KEM and ML-DSA sets and representative SHA2/SHAKE SLH-DSA end-to-end operations.
• Evaluate every ML-DSA signing rejection check before deciding to retry, document its remaining variable-time boundary, and inspect aggressively optimized ML-KEM/ML-DSA native control flow in CI.
• Split decoder fuzzing by family, isolate expensive exact-length SLH-DSA key imports, and run deterministic bounded fuzz cases in CI.
• Add release-ready opam metadata for three independent packages, Avrea-hosted CI across OCaml 4.13 through 5.4, a non-blocking lower-dependency-bounds job, and GitHub Actions pinned to the latest release SHAs.
• Document the unaudited security boundary and intentionally exclude all downstream protocol integrations from 0.1.0.