package tezos-protocol-015-PtLimaPt
A refutation game proof is required as part of the final move in a game.
This proof is basically a combination of a PVM proof (provided by each implementation of the PVM signature) and an input proof. To check the proof we must check each part separately and then also check that they match on the two points where they touch:
- the
input_requested
of the PVM proof should match the starting point of the input proof ;
- the
input_given
of the PVM proof should match the output message of the input proof.
It is also often the case that the PVM proof has No_input_required
for its input_requested
and None
for its input_given
. If this is the case, we don't need the input proof at all and the input_proof
parameter in our proof should be None
.
A PVM proof pvm_step
is combined with an input_proof
to provide the proof necessary to validate a single step in the refutation game.
If the step doesn't involve any input, proof_input_requested
pvm_step
and proof_input_given pvm_step
will be No_input_required
and None
respectively, and in this case inbox
should also be None
.
In the case that input is involved, input_proof
is either:
- a proof of the next inbox message available from the inbox after a given location; this must match up with
pvm_step
to give a valid refutation proof ; or
- a proof of a reveal satisfiability.
type input_proof =
| Inbox_proof of {
level : Raw_level_repr.t;
message_counter : Tezos_protocol_environment_015_PtLimaPt.Z.t;
proof : Sc_rollup_inbox_repr.serialized_proof;
}
| Reveal_proof of reveal_proof
val encoding : t Tezos_protocol_environment_015_PtLimaPt.Data_encoding.t
val pp : Tezos_protocol_environment_015_PtLimaPt.Format.formatter -> t -> unit
val start : t -> Sc_rollup_repr.State_hash.t
The state hash of the machine before the step. This must be checked against the value in the refutation game as well as checking the proof is valid.
val stop : t -> Sc_rollup_repr.State_hash.t
The state hash of the machine after the step. This must be checked against the value in the refutation game as well as checking the proof is valid.
val valid :
Sc_rollup_inbox_repr.history_proof ->
Raw_level_repr.t ->
pvm_name:string ->
t ->
(Sc_rollup_PVM_sig.input option * Sc_rollup_PVM_sig.input_request)
Tezos_protocol_environment_015_PtLimaPt.Error_monad.tzresult
Tezos_protocol_environment_015_PtLimaPt.Lwt.t
Check the validity of a proof.
This function requires a few bits of data (available from the refutation game record in the storage):
- a snapshot of the inbox, that may be used by the
input
proof ;
- the inbox level of the commitment, used to determine if an output from the
input
proof is too recent to be allowed into the PVM proof ;
- the
pvm_name
, used to check that the proof given has the right PVM kind.
It also returns the optional input executed during the proof and the input_request for the state at the beginning of the proof.
module type PVM_with_context_and_state = sig ... end
val produce :
(module PVM_with_context_and_state) ->
Raw_level_repr.t ->
t Tezos_protocol_environment_015_PtLimaPt.Error_monad.tzresult
Tezos_protocol_environment_015_PtLimaPt.Lwt.t
produce pvm_and_state inbox_context inbox_history commit_level
will construct a full refutation game proof out of the state
given in pvm_and_state
. It uses the inbox
if necessary to provide input in the proof. If the input is above or at commit_level
it will block it, and produce a proof that the PVM is blocked. If the input requested is a reveal the proof production will also fail.
This will fail if any of the context
, inbox_context
or inbox_history
given don't have enough data to make the proof. For example, the 'protocol implementation' version of each PVM won't be able to run this function. Similarly, the version of the inbox stored in the L1 won't be enough because it forgets old levels.
This uses the name
in the pvm_and_state
module to produce an encodable wrapped_proof
if possible. See the wrap_proof
function in Sc_rollups
.